Behavioural and neuroanatomical evidence in episodic memory in the rat by O'Brien, Jamus & University of Lethbridge. Faculty of Arts and Science
University of Lethbridge Research Repository
OPUS http://opus.uleth.ca
Theses Arts and Science, Faculty of
2007
Behavioural and neuroanatomical
evidence in episodic memory in the rat
O'Brien, Jamus
Lethbridge, Alta. : University of Lethbridge, Dept. of Psychology & Neuroscience
http://hdl.handle.net/10133/4425
Downloaded from University of Lethbridge Research Repository, OPUS
BEHAVIOURAL AND NEUROANATOMICAL EVIDENCE OF EPISODIC
MEMORY IN THE RAT
JAMUS O’BRIEN
B.Sc. University of Lethbridge, 2005
A Thesis
Submitted to the School of Graduate Studies 
of the University of Lethbridge 
in Partial Fulfillment of the 
Requirements for the Degree
MASTER’S OF SCIENCE
Department of Neuroscience 
University of Lethbridge 
LETHBRIDGE, ALBERTA, CANADA
© Jamus O’Brien, 2007
Abstract
In an attempt to test the hypothesis that rat's can perform very similar 
behaviours to episodic memory in humans, we here develop a novel 
Paviovian conditioning procedure demonstrating integrated what- 
where-when representations. Rats explored two distinctive contexts, 
one in the morning and the other in the evening. Subsequently, either 
in the morning or the evening, they received a foot shock immediately 
upon entry into a third context that equally resembled the two 
explored contexts. When conditioned freezing was measured at an 
intermediate time of day, rats showed significantly more fear of the 
context congruent with the time of day of the foot shock. Thus, rats 
automatically form an integrated time-place memory that can be 
flexibly updated by future events, essential characteristics of episodic 
memory. Furthermore, it is shown that these memories rely upon 
some of the same neuroanatomical structures, including the medial 
prefrontal cortex and the hippocampus, as are specifically required for 
episodic memory in humans.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this thesis is to experimentally examine the idea 
that nonhuman animals, (specifically rats) engage imcognitive 
processes that closely resemble episodic memory in humans. Included 
in this will be an examination of whether these processes rely upon the 
same fundamental neural circuits in humans and in our rat model of 
episodic memory. This section will define some of the common terms 
used in the episodic memory field, then set forth the idea that episodic 
memory exists in nonhuman animals, particularly the rat, as a 
cognitive process physiologically distinct from other putative memory 
systems. Contrary to many skeptical claims in the literature, it is the 
position of this thesis that episodic memory exists in the rat and is 
very closely related both functionally and neuroanatomically to the 
process given the same name in humans.
Learning is defined as the process by which an experience 
results in a relatively permanent change in behaviour, while memory is 
the process by which information gained in that experience is retained 
and later recalled. Memory is not a unitary process.. It is generally 
separated into two distinct categories - declarative and non­
declarative (Squire 1992; Squire and Cohen 1980). Non-declarative
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(or implicit) memory includes procedural memories and priming, as 
well as some forms of learning procedures such has habituation, 
sensitization, and simple forms of Pavlovian and operant conditioning. 
By definition it involves learning that cannot be communicated to 
others. Declarative memory includes memories for facts and events, 
and involves two branches - semantic memory, that is comprised of 
general facts about the world, independent of the context in which 
they were learned, and episodic memory, that refers to a 
representation of experiences including rich contextual components, 
such that upon retrieval one has a conscious experience of relevant 
components of the original experience. These categories are distinct 
not just in terms of function, but also in the cerebral networks they 
rely upon to perform their operations. In humans it is for the most part 
accepted that episodic and semantic memories refer to separate 
processes relying upon distinct circuitry for both storage and retrieval 
(Aggleton and Brown, 1999).
The term 'episodic memory' was originally coined by Canadian 
cognitive psychologist Endel Tulving (1972). He originally defined it as 
another branch of declarative memory, but one that referred not just 
to knowledge, but also to a recollection of the context and time in 
which that knowledge was acquired. Tulving (2001) later re-defined 
the term to include a component of autonoesis, meaning that episodic
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memory involved not just storage and retrieval of information, but that 
the retrieval was also was accompanied by an essential 
phenomenological experience of transporting one's conscious self 
mentally backwards in time, having an experience in mental space 
very similar to the original one which actually took place.
There were some sound reasons for this. Awareness outside the 
present is not a trivial thing by any means, it is central to our 
conceptions of reality. In fact the majority of human communication is 
directed via language tense either to the past or the future (Szagun, 
1978 as cited in Suddendorf and Busby 2003). An important issue is 
that it is currently impossible to empirically demonstrate any form of 
consciousness in non-linguistic species, never mind a special "time 
traveling consciousness". The present paper then will focus first on 
other more recent formulations of episodic memory and their essential 
criteria for establishing the presence of episodic memory. Importantly 
these are criteria that can in principle be satisfied experimentally.
Later, the issue of autonoetic consciousness, and what its existence in 
humans means for research attempting to show episodic memory in 
animal models, will be returned to and addressed from a theoretical 
perspective.
Tulving's claim is that only humans could possibly have episodic 
memories, because only humans have a sense of self or "autonoetic
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awareness" with which they could perform this mental time travel. As 
the very term "episodic memory" was defined to include this criterion, 
researchers on animal models coined the term "episodic-like" to refer 
to memories that meet all the criteria except autonoetic awareness. 
Tulving proposes that the essential circuitry underlying autonoetic 
awareness includes specific regions of frontal cortex (Wheeler, Stuss 
and Tulving 1997). In contrast to his view of episodic memory and its 
definition based on the phenomenological aspects of subjective 
experiences, more recent approaches to episodic memory in 
nonhuman animals identify the types of information that are 
specifically involved. This paper will not use the term 'episodic-like' 
except when repeating other author's descriptions of their studies. 
When we read about any cognitive function of an animal it is 
understood that the processes are not going to be identical to those in 
humans.
A group of experiments reviewed in Chapter 2, and lauded as the 
original and still the best demonstration of episodic memory processes 
in animals, are the now classic scrub jay studies of Clayton, Dickinson 
and colleagues. In 1998 they were able to show all but the autonoetic 
criterion for episodic memory in a non-human species. They adopted 
the lesser mantle of 'episodic-like memory' to describe these 
behaviours in recognition of this purported deficiency. Even if scrub
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jays do exhibit episodic memory in the strict sense however, they are
$ .
far from the ideal experimental model from the perspective of 
modeling human disease that affects episodic memory systems. For 
one, aves and primates made their evolutionary split more than two 
hundred million years ago. Without convincing evidence of episodic 
memory in a more closely related species, one from the same class at 
least, it is possible that bird episodic memory is an example of 
convergent evolution rather than having roots in the same biology as 
humans. A potential consequence is that the same neuroanatomical 
systems may not be involved. For this and other reasons it is 
important to establish if another mammal, and for the practical 
considerations of neuroscience modeling, especially a rat or mouse, 
can meet the information-based criteria for episodic memory. There is 
no perfect model, but the rat offers many clear homologies in neural 
structure and functions and has been the focus of the majority of 
behavioural neuroscientific experimentation for many decades 
(Whishaw 2006).
The advantages of such a model are clear and numerous. Not 
only does would it challenge longstanding theory, but there are 
numerous types of neurological insults to which episodic memory 
seems particularly susceptible over and above other declarative 
memory processes. A model in animals then will provide a means of
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detecting these subtle insults and observing the effects of 
manipulations which may affect changes in both humans and rats.
There are three main conditions for demonstrating the existence 
of episodic memory in nonhuman animals, and all will be addressed in 
this paper. First, animals must be able to represent, aspects of an 
experience which include spatial and temporal dimensions bound into 
an integrated representation. In other words, what happens must be 
represented along with when and where. This must be explicitly 
demonstrated as a behavioural alteration in response to a learning 
episode (Clayton et al., 2003). Second, if we are to believe that this is 
a very similar episodic memory system to that present in humans, it 
should also be true that the brain regions underlying this behaviour in 
humans should also be implicated in nonhuman animals. Third, the 
historical condition which states that episodic memory recall must 
involve a conscious re-experiencing of the original event, must be 
acknowledged (Tulving, 2002). As this cannot be tested empirically, 
strong arguments must be presented as to why it is not a valid 
mandatory criterion.
In the next portion of this manuscript (Chapter 2) an experiment 
will be described that, on the most straightforward interpretation, 
indicates that rats can satisfy accepted criteria for episodic memory.
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Accepted components of episodic memory will be reviewed and 
whether rats demonstrate these components will be evaluated.
In Chapter 3 evidence will be provided that the episodic abilities 
demonstrated in the first section do indeed rely upon very similar 
neural structures used by humans to perform the same functions. If 
episodic memory processes in a nonhuman animal are a close 
evolutionary relative to the version of the trait observed in humans, it 
is likely to rely upon the same conserved brain system that originally 
facilitated the types of computations necessary. Although there are 
already a number of models purported to be demonstrations of 
episodic memory in the rat (reviewed in chapter 2), and there is also a 
large body of literature pertaining to the brain areas used in humans 
to perform episodic memory in humans (reviewed in chapter 3), no 
research has yet combined these two avenues of research. Thus a 
purpose of the present thesis is to test for the contribution of the 
cortical areas used by humans, and also present in animals, to 
performance of episodic memory. The second function of this paper 
will be to conduct said experiments, testing the assertions of Tulving 
(2002) and Suddendorf and Corbalis (1997) that episodic memory 
represents an evolutionary discontinuity akin to human language.
The third problem is not one that can be resolved empirically with our 
current technology, nor that available in the foreseeable future, and so
7
will primarily be addressed theoretically in the closing discussion. As
!E;
perTulving's definition of the term 'episodic memory', an awareness of 
self is essential. He argues episodic memory is not just the ability to 
recall personal experiences, it is necessary that the experience of 
recall involves a cognitive reenactment of the learning episode, with 
the person remembered as the actor, but aware that he is simply 
acting and not actually physically transporting himself back in time. 
He/she must not only be able to have a representation of himself, but 
a meta-representation as well. Thus, you must be able to remember 
yourself - your psyche. As things stand, it is impossible to prove 
mammals (at least lower order ones) have a concept of self; it is thus 
impossible to prove animals have episodic memory if this criterion 
cannot be rejected on other grounds. This is more a philosophical 
point, and will be dealt with as such.
The position of this paper is that episodic memory in animals is a 
close relative of episodic memory in humans, performing the same 
functions through use of the similar neural circuitry to solve similar 
sorts of problems. It comprises a distinct, though somewhat 
overlapping system from regular semantic memory, and can be 
defined and evaluated based on the types of information it represents 
and the circuits involved in doing so, without recourse to additional 
phenomenological or first-person experiential criteria.
8
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CHAPTER 2 - BEHAVIOURAL EVIDENCE FOR EPISODIC
MEMORY IN THE RAT
Several commentators have suggested that the key properties of 
episodic memories are that they represent when an episode occurred 
as well as what the event relationships were and where the episode 
took place. Furthermore, the reactivation of an episodic memory 
representation can occur outside of the relevant context. Clayton et al. 
(2003) suggest three related criteria for establishing episodic memory 
competence in nonlinguistic species: what, where, when content: an 
integrated representation of these three elements of content; and, 
flexibility in updating memory representations in light of new 
information gathered after the original episode. It has since been 
argued that flexible deployment of learned information is a 
characteristic of all declarative memory, and hence need not be 
explicitly demonstrated in an episodic task that obviously cannot be 
solved by implicit processes (Dere et al., 2006). Replacing this 
criterion are several other requirements put forth by various 
researchers in the field, including that: the test be novel and 
unexpected; the test be performed at a time point that exceeds the 
capacity of short term memory storage (Dere et al., 2006); that the 
task cannot be solved by familiarity judgments or comparison of
10
memory trace strength (Gallistel, 1990); and that the memory be 
ideally formed in a single, unique, one-trial learning episode to 
preclude the possibility of performance being mediated by a strategy 
of semantic rule learning (Morris 2001).
Many believe that deficits in an episodic memory system are at 
the core of human medial temporal lobe amnesia, most memory 
disorders, and certain dementias. Certainly episodic representational 
processes appear to be highly susceptible to brain trauma and 
neurodegenerative disorders, over and above the loss seen in 
procedural memory (Scoville and Milner, 1957), priming (Schacter 
1987) or semantic knowledge (Vargha-Khadeem et al. 1997; Janowsky 
Shimura and Squire 1989) from a variety of insults. A model of 
episodic memory in animals that can be subjected to empirical 
manipulations then would provide an extra level of sensitivity, so that 
cognitive decline in models of neurodegeneration could be detected 
earlier, and effects of minor physical trauma currently below our 
detection threshold could be discerned. Thus, understanding the 
behavioural processes involved in episodic memory and its possible 
basis in rats is of considerable general importance.
There is little doubt that humans have such memories, but do 
nonhuman animals? It would be justified to conclude they are absent 
in rats after numerous strong attempts to demonstrate them have
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failed. Recently there has emerged a number of elegant 
demonstrations that rats can flexibly update integrated 
representations of what and where events occur (see for example 
Morris, 2006), or what, where and serial order or recency (Kart-Teke 
et al., 2006; Dere, Huston and De Souza Silva, 2005)), but an 
integrated representation that includes a "time-stamp" or explicit 
temporal context is not established.
Clearly the trick in such a demonstration is to show that a rat 
has an integrated representation of what, where and when, and that it 
can be adaptively updated in light of new, relevant events. We 
demonstrate here that rats spontaneously form such representations 
in the course of visiting new environments.
One way to arrange such a demonstration has been devised for 
the Western scrub jay (Clayton, et al., 2001). These investigators have 
taken advantage of the fact that these jays naturally cache both 
perishable and non-perishable food. It is well established that they 
remember where their caches are located, and because they find some 
foods more palatable than others, their cache site preferences reveal 
that they remember what was cached. By varying when the more 
palatable, but perishable, food (wax worms) were cached in relation to 
the opportunities to retrieve cached foods, one can use the cache site 
retrieval preferences to learn if the jays remember when they cached
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the perishable, but more palatable, foods. If allowed to recover food 4 
hours post-cache, jays will preferentially recover the worms. However, 
if the delay is extended to 5 days, long after the worms would have 
degraded, jays will instead retrieve non-perishable peanuts which were 
cached at the same time as the worms. All of the aforementioned 
criteria are met, and the "when" component or temporal context is 
shown not to be due to relative recency, serial order, forgetting, or 
strength of the memory. It is due to the animals being able to recall 
the experience of food caching. This represents a clear example of 
episodic memory in a bird species, though the authors give it the 
lesser mantle of'episodic-like', as they do not meet Tulving's defining 
criterion of autonoetic awareness (De Kort, et al., 2005; Griffiths & 
Clayton, 2001).
To address this issue, the authors later show that jays are 
sensitive to espionage by other member's of their species. A jay that 
detects that it is being observed during food caching will later rebury 
its food in another location (Clayton et al., 2003). One interpretation is 
that the jay is acting purposely to thwart thievery and is sensitive to 
the future need it will experience. A more recent study shows that jays 
can even possess prospective planning. In a very clever experiment 
(which could possibly be adapted to rats as well), jays were housed in 
a cage with three adjacent compartments between which they could
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move freely. Each morning for 6 days a bird would be confined to a
S';
single compartment for 2 hours, one that never contained food, and a 
second that provided access to powdered nuts, which could be 
consumed but not cached. On day 7 the powdered nuts were replaced 
with whole nuts, and it was found that jays would cache 3 times as 
many nuts in the food deprivation compartment as in the powder 
compartment, in anticipation of the next morning's predicted 
separation from food (Correia, Dickinson & Clayton, 2007; Raby et al., 
2007). This demonstration provides a strong challenge to the 
longstanding Bischof-Kohler hypothesis, which states that nonhuman 
animals cannot take actions to serve future motivational states, only 
present ones (Suddendorf and Corbalis, 1997).
However, birds are evolutionarily distant from mammals 
including humans, and it could be argued that these episodic abilities 
are an example of convergent evolution specific to birds, relying on 
radically different computations and neural substrates. It would not be 
prudent to use bird episodic memory as a model for the human 
variant, while a more closely related model species would clearly be 
helpful, and thus we look to the rat, the most well investigated 
mammalian model for behavioural processes.
It is already established that the rat's event representations can 
contain information about where events occur and, based upon the
14
reinforcer devaluation experiments, it is clear that they remember
i-;
what outcomes are expected there (see Day et al., 2003 for a very 
nice demonstration of this in a novel learning procedure involving 
where-what paired associates). What remains to be demonstrated in 
the rat is that the same event representation can also contain 
information about when the event occurred. The "when" component 
should not be related to simple recency, familiarity, memory strength, 
serial order, but rather should be analogous to a "time-stamp" as in 
Gallistel's (1990) notion of a temporal context being provided by 
endogenous circadian oscillators. There has also been a suggestion the 
timestamp may be represented by temporal associations between 
event occurrence and the age of recently born granule cells in the 
dentate gyrus of the hippocampus (Aimone, Wiles and Gage, 2006).
It is the temporal component which defines an episodic memory as 
relating to a unique experience. While a given context or stimulus may 
be encountered any number of times in an animal's life, a moment 
that has passed never occurs again. The sense of subjective time is 
defined by the temporal order of representations of life experiences, 
though Eacott and Norman (2002) suggest 'occasion specifier' rather 
than actual timeline.
Crystal and Babb (2002) for instance used a modified version of 
the eight-armed radial maze to conduct an approximation of the
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original scrub jay experiments using rats. Rats were trained to learn a 
foraging paradigm where one arm baited with chocolate flavoured 
pellets was replenished after a long delay (4 h), but not a short one 
(30 min). The rat then altered its behaviour by visiting the chocolate 
arm preferentially after the long, but not short delay. They could also 
learn to avoid the arm by pairing the chocolate with lithium chloride 
(Babb and Crystal 2005). This experiment confirms that rats can use 
combined spatial and temporal duration to solve discriminations, 
though it requires extensive training and thus cannot be considered to 
represent a one-trial learning episode. The task may possibly be 
solved by a semantic rule learning strategy (Hampton and Schwartz 
2004).
Another recent demonstration of integrated what-where-when 
representations are novel object exploration experiments in mice 
(Dere, Houston & De Souza Silva 2005) and later in rats by Kart-Teke 
and colleagues (2006). The amount of time that a rat spends 
investigating one object over another is generally accepted to be 
inversely related to the strength or extent of memory for the object, 
all other things considered equal (Ennaceur & Delacour, 1988). Taking 
advantage of the fact that, given two very familiar objects, a Wistar 
rat will preferentially investigate the one it was least recently exposed 
to (showing rats can make serial order/recency judgements (Mitchell
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and Laiacona, 1998, Hanneson et al., 2004), and that rats will also 
show a preference for an object in a new location relative to an equally 
familiar but consistently positioned object (Ennaceur et al., 1997). 
They could remember objects, object locations, and presentation order 
at various time points. Memory about items, context and temporal 
sequence are thus demonstrated. A limitation of this design however is 
that animals could undoubtedly solve this discrimination using recency 
judgments - for instance by comparing strengths of memory traces, 
rather then the relative position of presentations along an 
autobiographical timeline, particularly when the time difference was 
limited to 50 minutes (Yonelinas 2002). While the Kart-teke 
experiment avoids the pitfalls of extensive training paradigms and 
reinforcement, object recognition paradigms such as this are also 
somewhat questionable as a model for episodic memories, as the 
maximum delay interval between exposure and testing at which a rat 
can still make temporal order judgments is only 3 hours (King et al., 
2004). Again, any task requiring an extensive training regimen is 
likely to be solved using semantic rule learning rather than event 
recollection. Effects were also eliminated by a pre-trial saline injection, 
attesting to a minimal strength of association.
A third and final recent experiment of note in rats was by Ergorul 
and Eichenbaum (2004). While they clearly show in their 2004
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experiment that rats can infer temporal order of odour presentations 
by using spatial cues and remembering odours, the extensive training 
paradigm used to teach rats about the scents means this experiment 
too falls short on the stricter qualification as an episodic memory.
Other species where episodic-like memory has been 
demonstrated include honeybees (Menzel et al., 2006), hummingbirds 
(Henderson et al., 2006), pigeons (Zentall et al., 2001) gorillas 
(Schwartz et al., 2005) and dolphins (Mercado et al., 1998). There are 
actually numerous strong examples of episodic memory in primates 
(reviewed in Scwartz & Evans, 2001), though if this manuscript can 
achieve its goal of demonstrating episodic memory is also present in 
rodents, such processes in primates should be of no surprise.
We have developed a simple way to examine aspects of episodic 
memory in the rat which addresses all relevant challenges by using a 
variant of the contextual fear conditioning procedure. It is known that 
robust fear of a previously explored context is acquired as a result of a 
single learning episode involving foot shock and that rats can acquire 
fear of an explored context if foot shock is paired with retrieval of the 
memory for that context (Rudy & O'Reilly, 2001). Fanselow (1990) 
showed that if rats receive a foot shock immediately upon entry into a 
novel context they do not acquire a conditioned fear response to that 
context. However, if the day before the immediate shock episode they
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explore the context for a few minutes then they do acquire robust 
conditioned fear of the context. Rudy et al. (2002) showed further that 
the fear becomes associated only with the mnemonic representation of 
the pre-exposed context, even if that context is not the same as the 
one the immediate shock actually occurs in. This implies that it is not 
actually the context which is being associated with the shock event, 
but rather a mnemonic representation of the context, likely retrieved 
by cues associated with transport of the animals.
The theory behind contextual fear conditioning is that a 
"conjunctive representation" of a context must be formed, and that it 
is to this representation that the aversive event (the shock) is 
associated. By 'conjunctive representation' we mean a single, unified 
representation of all the elements which compose the context (odour, 
luminance, texture, area, temperature, sound, etc.) (Fanselow and 
Rudy 1998; Young, Bonheneck and Fanselow, 1994). It is also our 
assertion that, in certain events, and possibly in all, time of 
occurrence/position along an autobiographical timeline is also one of 
the elements automatically encoded and bound to the other features 
to aid in pattern separation. Fanselow's "immediate shock effect" 
provides a particularly powerful means of investigating this 'context 
pre-exposure facilitation effect'.
The procedure is basically as follows: A naive rat is placed in a
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context in which it has never experienced, immediately (within
i ;
seconds) upon entrance the rats receives a footshock, and then is 
quickly removed. If the rat is subsequently returned to the context at 
a later time, it will not demonstrate any fear memory of the context. 
However, if the same procedure is conducted except that it is preceded 
by a period of exposure to a context, followed by a delay, and then 
immediate shock, the animal will demonstrate robust freezing on re­
exposure. Furthermore, the rat can even be immediately shocked in an 
entirely different context than the pre-exposed one (though one to 
which it is similarly transported), and it will display robust fear 
specifically to the exposed context and not to the one in which it 
actually experienced the aversive stimulus (Rudy and O'Reilly 2001). 
The idea then is that, at least in the rat, formation of the conjunctive 
representation requires a short, but non-negligible, period of time in 
which to instantiate itself into a neural trace. Without the time 
necessary to form this bound representation the subject has an 
incomplete pattern, consisting primarily of salient transport cues with 
a period of presence in an ambiguous context. (Rudy, Barrientos and 
O'Reilly). An important point to emphasize then is that it is a 
representation or memory of a context, likely retrieved by pattern 
completion of a subset of cues involved in transport (Marr, 1971; 
McNaughton and Morris, 1987), to which the shock is associated, not
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the actual physical features of the shock environment. (O'Reilly and 
Rudy, 2001; Rudy and O'Reilly, 2001).
Rudy and O'Reilly were also able to demonstrate that the few 
seconds pre-shock on the conditioning day given to allow detection of 
enough elemental cues to support pattern completion, could in fact be 
eliminated if specific transport cues are provided (2001). Using 
neurotoxic lesions of the dorsal hippocampus, Rudy Barrientos and 
O'Reilly demonstrated that this context pre-exposure facilitation effect 
is indeed dependant upon the hippocampus.
We took advantage of this "Fanselow effect" to show that 
contextual fear conditioning meets the criteria for episodic memory in 
rats in the following way. We allowed each rat to explore two distinct 
contexts at two different times of day (morning and night) for a total 
of three days. The rats subsequently received an immediate foot shock 
upon entry into a third, 'chimeric', context constructed out of equal 
elements of the morning and night contexts. Each rat received only a 
single shock in the chimeric box, at either the morning or the night. All 
rats were then tested for learned fear at a neutral time of day, either 
in the context that is congruent with the time of day that the shock 
occurred or in the context that is incongruent (see also detailed 
methods below).
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METHODS
Subjects:
Male Long-Evans rats (Charles River, Quebec; 300-350 g) were 
housed individually in standard laboratory cages, kept on a 12:12 
light-dark cycle (lights on at 07:00) and provided with food and water 
ad libitum. Rats were acclimated to vivarium conditions for at least one 
week prior to beginning of behavioural testing.
Apparatus:
Conditioning boxes were Plexiglas modular test chambers with 
steel grid floor (ENV-008 MedAssociates, Inc., Georgia, VT). Box A had 
black coloured walls and was scented with the cleaning agent Quatzyl- 
D-Plus. Box B was white and scented with Clinicide brand disinfectant.
A third context, C, was designed so as to be chimeric, containing equal 
elements of boxes A and B. It was half black, half white, and contained 
no added odour. All boxes were in the same spatial location, and the 
tops were left clear to allow for video recording via a ceiling mounted 
camera. Contextual components were counter-balanced.
Procedure:
22
Figure 1.1 presents the three phases of experiment 1. In Phase 1,
i ;
22 rats repeatedly explored two distinctive boxes (A or B).
Box A was visited on three successive mornings and Box B on three 
successive evenings for 9 minutes each on Day 1, 7 minutes on Day 2 
and 5 minutes on Day 3, for a total exposure duration of 21 minutes 
per context. In Phase 2, all rats received a single immediate shock 
(1.0 mA for 2 s, commencing within 2 seconds of box entry and 
followed by 3 seconds of exposure for a total phase duration of 7 
seconds) in a 'chimeric' box composed of equal elements of Box A and 
B - it was half black, half white and was unscented. Exposures to all 
boxes occurred in the same spatial location. For half of the rats the 
shock occurred in the morning, for the other half the shock occurred in 
the evening. Exposure boxes and shock times were counter-balanced 
such that neither environment was better represented at the time of 
the shock across groups. In Phase 3, freezing was measured at a time 
midway between the morning and evening sessions in a box that was 
congruent with the time of the immediate shock for half of the rats, or 
incongruent for the other half.
Experiment 2, as shown in figure 1.2, involved the same 
procedure describe for experiment 1, except with all phases occurring 
at mid-day. In phase 1, 12 rats were consecutively exposed to boxes A 
and B. To establish a baseline assessment level for freezing, an
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additional 4 animals was run without receiving a footshock during the 
chimeric exposure in phase 2. The procedure in experiment 3 was also 
identical to that for experiment 1, with the exception that one group 
of 6 rats was tested for freezing in Box C (figure 1.3) and compared to 
12 treated as in experiment 1.
EXPERIMENT 1: Episodic Memory Model
If rats acquired an integrated representation of time and place at 
the time of exploration that is retrieved by cues related to the time of 
occurrence of foot shock, then fear of the congruent context should 
selectively emerge during fear testing. If the rat "automatically" 
changes its behaviour in the presence of the context with the same 
time-stamp as the shock, without any further direct experience with 
the context, we will have demonstrated that rats have an integrated 
representation of when, where and what that can be flexibly accessed 
and adaptively altered..
Results and discussion:
A repeated measure ANOVA was conducted on the percent of 
time spent freezing on the test day (Figure 2.1). Our observed power 
to detect a difference between congruent and incongruent groups was 
0.7. Rats showed robust freezing on the test day that declined reliably
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over the first three minutes of re-exposure to the contexts (F(2,40) = 
8.0, p < .001). The rats placed in the context that they had explored 
at the same time of day as the subsequent foot shock in the 
ambiguous context showed more freezing at each minute of testing 
compared to rats placed in the incongruent context (F(l,20) = 45.0, p 
< .001). The freezing shown by the rats in the incongruent context, 
especially during the first minute, likely reflects generalization. It is 
thus confirmed that rats can acquire the types of representations 
defined by previous investigators as constituting episodic memory 
processes (Clayton et al., 2003; Dere et al., 2006). Furthermore, that 
the learning episode consists of a single trial eliminates the possibility 
that performance of the task is mediated by rule learning or other 
semantic information, as would be suspect in tasks requiring an 
extensive training paradigm.
EXPERIMENT 2: Test for Requirement of Temporal Cues
It was predicted that without any temporal cues available to 
distinguish between the pre-exposed contexts animals would not show 
differential freezing between contexts during testing. The temporal cue 
should be necessary for retrieval of representations for the association 
of fear.
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Resu lts and D iscussion:
Repeated measures ANOVA on freezing revealed that there is a 
significant difference in freezing between groups (F(2,13) = 4.7, p = 
.03). There also a significant difference across the three minutes of 
testing (F(2,13) = 18.1, p < .001). Post hoc analysis by Tukey HSD 
detected no difference between conditioning to context A or B (p = 
.940). A borderline significant increase in freezing in the white box 
versus the unshocked rats was seen (p < .06), with a more robust 
difference observed between the black context tested animals and the 
unshocked rats (p < .05). This supports our interpretation that the cue 
used to discriminate between the two contexts was indeed temporal in 
nature, and that contextual components were not being used to 
differentially associate fear to the two boxes.
EXPERIMENT 3: Test for Conditioning to Shock Context
This control experiment was conducted to confirm Rudy and 
O'Reilly's (2001) postulation that it is the conjunctive representation of 
the pre-exposed context that is retrieved during the immediate shock 
phase, and that it is this representation to which the fear becomes 
associated.
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Resu lts and discussion:
Repeated measure ANOVA again confirmed a significant effect of 
freezing between groups (F (2, 13) = 7.11, p < .008). Post hoc 
analyses using Tukey HSD showed significantly less freezing in the 
chimeric condition as compared to the congruent (p < 0.05), with no 
differences between the chimeric and the incongruent groups (p =
0.5). That more fear is shown to the congruent context than the one 
where shock actually occurred also addresses the possible concern 
that rats in Experiment 1 simply conditioned to a box that somehow 
shared the most elements to the conditioning context.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Like all classical conditioning paradigms, this task shows that a 
rat can learn information that can then be used to make predictions 
about future life events (Gallistel 1990), addressing to some degree 
the flexible deployment criterion set forth by Clayton, Bussey, 
Dickinson and De Kort (2003).
Suddendorf and Busby (2003) also require for true episodic 
memory that "(t)he memory should be shown to use a generative, 
reconstructive process at retrieval," even claiming that "accuracy is 
not imperative". While they may be correct in their further claim that 
the scrub-jay experiments do not meet this criterion, our experiments
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very clearly depend on event reconstruction by way of the fact that
$ .
conditioning is in some respects to a false memory. The only way this 
could possibly be occurring is if the memory truly was a reconstructive 
process as opposed to retrieval of an unalterable snapshot. As to their 
requirement of meta-representation and that episodic memory can be 
used to plan for the future, to some degree this is inherent in the fact 
that freezing, a response to an anticipated aversive event, will be 
expressed only if an aversive event would be expected in the given 
context. The "what, where and when" content criteria are clearly 
demonstrated, and structure is seen in the fact that the memory is a 
reconstructed integrated representation.
The actual Pavlovian conditioning trial was under 10 seconds in 
duration, with a single aversive stimulus to which emotional 
associations would be formed. Though pre-exposure sessions were 
necessary for the animal to learn about the contexts in which the 
event occurred (or in which they thought it occurred), it is clear that 
these exposures do not qualify as extensive training. The integration of 
what, where, and when was clearly achieved. The only way the rat 
could possibly have differentially attributed fear to the pre-exposure 
contexts is if it had a memory for the time of day at which it had been 
shocked (when) and that that cue served to pattern complete a unified 
memory which included the conjunctive context representation
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(where) that was activated at the moment of shock (what).
Experiment 2 precludes the possibility that somehow the test context 
was more similar to one pre-exposure context than the other - time is 
the critical factor. We focused on the temporal component as that is 
the most unique factor making up any episodic experience (the same 
time can only occur once) (in the case of our experiments however it is 
unclear whether simply time of day is being conditioned).
One conditioning session involving a single foot shock 
immediately upon entry into a context can lead to significant 
conditioned fear responses in similar, explored contexts. In preliminary 
work (data not shown) we found that rats receiving the same 
immediate shock episode but without prior context exploration did not 
show a learned fear response, confirming the reliability of the 
Fanselow effect observed by others (Fanselow, 1990; Rudy et al., 
2002). Significantly for our purposes, the rats in the present study 
discriminated between the two test contexts, in line with the episodic 
memory hypothesis. That is, they displayed significantly more 
conditioned freezing in the context that they had explored at the same 
time of day as the immediate foot shock session. It is important to 
emphasize that the non-temporal cues present at the time of the 
immediate shock were composed of equal elements of the two test 
contexts, thus the temporal cue (morning or evening) must have
29
provided a basis for discrimination at the time of learning. Furthermore
$ .
the next day, at the time of testing, the temporal cues were 
completely ambiguous, thus only the nontemporal elements of the 
context could serve as a basis for discrimination.
The fact that the rats showed clear learned fear of the context 
congruent with the time of day of the shock supports the following 
notions. During exploration rats acquire a memory that contains an 
integrated representation of the elements of the context, including the 
time of day. The time of day cue during the immediate foot shock 
session selectively retrieves the memory of the congruent context.
This memory is updated by the association with foot shock, such that 
when the rats are exposed the next day to the elements of the context 
at a neutral time of day, they respond defensively to the congruent 
context. Because of the design of this experiment we know that rats 
are not using differential familiarity, recency, memory strength, or 
serial order of the contexts or interval timing to solve this problem. 
Instead, a parsimonious account is that rats have an integrated 
representation of place and temporal context that can be accessed via 
temporal or non-temporal cues, leading to adaptive future behavior.
There is some uncertainty about the nature of the temporal cues 
due to a lack of research, but one possibility is that they are based 
upon information from endogenous circadian oscillators as suggested
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by Gallistel (1990). Howvever, it can not be the case that circadian
$ .
rhythms are the sole temporal cue as this would allow for only a 24 
hour cycle of uniqueness. Another suggestion is that the time-stamp 
may be represented by temporal associations between event 
occurrence and the age of recently born granule celts in the dentate 
gyrus of the hippocampus (Aimone et al., 2006). Whatever the nature 
of the 'time-stamp" contributed by the mPFC, it is likely an integrated 
association of various cues which together form a distinct 
representation of a unique moment in subjective time, just as the 
hippocampus integrates various spatial elements into a single context 
representation. It is important to note that while the midday time- 
point may not be exactly equally different from morning and night 
tests in terms of contextual elements, there was no difference between 
animals within congruency groups, regardless of the time of day at 
which they were shocked. Thus, the temporal cue outweighs slight 
contextual discrepancies in determining which context becomes 
associated with the shock episode. This is supported by the control 
experiment in which the temporal cue was removed by conducting all 
pre-exposures and the immediate shock at mid-day. This resulted in 
rats being unable to differentially attribute fear to the test contexts.
The task described here meets the criteria for episodic memory 
in rats. It combines the advantages of previous investigations while
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addressing some of their shortcomings. We conclude from this that 
rats have a sophisticated representational process in which temporal 
cues are integrated with "where" and "what" information to form 
distinct autobiographical memories of past experiences. With the 
exception of Tulving's (1983) criterion of'autonoetic awareness', a 
phenomenological quality that is currently un-testable in non-linguistic 
species, this task meets the qualifications required for a demonstration 
of episodic memory in the rat.
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CHAPTER 3 - NEUROANATOMICAL EVIDENCE FOR EPISODIC
MEMORY IN THE RAT
Chapter 2 presents evidence that rats have a memory system 
that resembles aspects of the human episodic memory system. In this 
chapter we seek to extend the resemblance from purely behavioural 
criteria to the level of neural structures that underlie this system in 
rats and humans. Establishing strong similarities at the behavioural as 
well as neuroanatomical levels would increase our confidence that 
manipulations of the rat model will have validity in respect to human 
conditions. The neural circuits underlying episodic memory in humans 
have been investigated in behavioural studies of brain damaged 
individuals, as well as functional neuroimaging studies involving PET 
and fMRI. The findings will be reviewed here with specific attention to 
fundamental features that can be tested in the rat model of episodic 
memory presented in the previous chapter. If it holds that the same 
brain regions that are important in human episodic memory make 
comparable contributions to performance of our episodic task, this will 
provide an additional source of support that the model may be useful 
in modeling human memory disorder and treatments. There are also a 
number of unresolved issues about the nature of differences between 
semantic and episodic memory which could benefit from study of an
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animal model. To our knowledge, this is the first empirical attempt to
f ;
bridge the gap between the robust findings on neurophysiology of 
episodic memory in humans and a potential model in a non-primate 
species.
The first brain region frequently associated with declarative 
memory or contextual representation is the hippocampus. This large 
piece of archicortex has been investigated so extensively with respect 
to these functions that it has become nearly synonymous with them. It 
is also frequently stated that the hippocampus and adjacent cortices 
are critically involved in memory for events in people's lives, or 
episodic memory (Eichenbaum and Cohen, 2001). The hippocampus, 
in concert with adjacent parahippocampal cortices, is generally 
understood to be an information binder, responsible for taking 
multimodal perceptual representations of any one experience, and 
then integrating and storing them as conjunctive representations or 
propositions (Sutherland and Rudy, 1989; Anagnosteras et al., 1999, 
Cohen and Squire, 1980). Additional important regions associated with 
explicit memory operations are found scattered throughout the 
neocortex, with the prefrontal cortical areas, or PFC, being of 
particular relevance to episodic memory. Numerous theories have 
been proposed to explain how the various physiological and functional
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components of the explicit memory system operate, though only three
t;
will be addressed in this paper.
Theories of Explicit Memory:
The first and probably most well known theory is referred to 
simply as "Declarative Memory Theory", and was initially proposed by 
Cohen and Squire in 1980. In its most simple form, this theory states 
that declarative memory formation and storage initially requires the 
hippocampus, in concert with other medial temporal lobe structures, in 
order to bind together all the many elements of a learning experience 
into a retrievable representation. Over time however, associations 
formed within neocortical areas are sufficient to mediate recall, via a 
process of consolidation directed by the hippocampus (Squire & 
Alvarez, 1995; Squire et al, 2004). The nature and necessity of this 
consolidative process is still somewhat unclear, though McNaughton's 
group probably provides the most plausible explanation, supported by 
computational models, in that the hippocampus is required to play a 
short term role in binding and maintaining various neocortical 
representations that are initially highly plastic and thus subject to 
decay and interference (McNaughton et al., 2003). The neocortex may 
acquire some simple, elemental memory representations through 
perceptual processing, but actual facts and events are initially
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recorded solely within the medial temporal lobe (Squire and Zola-
t;
Morgan 1991). Squire's theory does not recognize an anatomical 
distinction between semantic and episodic memory, claiming any 
differences are purely categorical, that is simply different components 
of a unitary function. In terms of processing then, both are simply 
propositional representations dealt with by the medial temporal lobe in 
the same manner. Squire does however concede that some 
propositional information necessary for source memory may be stored 
in the frontal cortex, as indicated by studies of amnesic patients 
(Shimamura and Squire, 1987).
"Configural" or "conjunctive" theory, proposed in its original form 
by Sutherland and Rudy in 1989, stated that the hippocampus plays a 
unique and essential role in combining incoming multimodal perceptual 
elements into unitary conjunctive representations. In light of new 
experimental evidence the theory was later modified (Sutherland and 
Rudy 1995) to allow for a role for the neocortex in forming conjunctive 
representations with storage and binding during retrieval being 
directed by the hippocampus. In contrast to Squire's theory, configural 
theory holds that two types of memory representations are set for any 
given experience - one which is rapidly established and stored in the 
hippocampus automatically and indiscriminately, and a second which is 
more slowly and purposefully set in various regions of the neocortex.
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The idea is that the hippocampal representation influences and 
enhances the neocortical representations by rapidly separating out 
similar memory patterns so as to prevent interference between and 
increase the efficiency of associations between traces (Sutherland and 
Rudy, 1995). The function of the hippocampus then is to separate out 
which of the elemental representations set in the neocortex need to be 
bound together during recall into the appropriate unitary 
representation (O'Reilly and Rudy 2001).
This theory does an excellent job of explaining the observation 
that while standard contextual fear conditioning (association of fear to 
a context in which an aversive stimulus has been experienced) can be 
observed in the absence of a hippocampus (Wiltgen et al., 2006), 
associations to context by way of Fanselow's (1990) immediate shock 
paradigm cannot. During the extremely short pre-shock interval an 
animal without the rapidly conjunctive hippocampal system available 
will be unable to efficiently retrieve the context representation to 
enable association with the shock. Neocortical systems can 
independently, but inefficiently, acquire different bits of elemental 
information and form associations between them, allowing for context- 
fear associations if given enough time, but they do so much more 
slowly. Similarly, it is well documented that simple associations such 
as the ones formed in non-conjunctive classical conditioning tasks are
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hippocampus independent (Beggs et al., 1999), whereas associations
i;
between events separated in time (i.e. trace conditioning) are not 
(Moyer et al., 1993). An episodic memory system must always be on 
line recording and updating events, due to the impossibility of 
predicting when and where an experience worth remembering might 
occur (Morris and Frey, 1997). Configural theory would then predict 
that damage to the hippocampus will result in severe impairment of 
episodic faculties, whereas it would have only a small to moderate 
impact on semantic functioning that can still be mediated, albeit less 
efficiently, solely by neo-cortical sites.
In Squire's model episodic and semantic memory are like two 
sides of the same coin - inseparable components of the same process 
that works to carry out the broader function of declarative memory. In 
contrast Tulving proposes a "Serial Parallel Independent" model (serial 
recording, parallel storage, and independent retrieval, SPI) (Tulving, 
1993, 1995; as cited in Tulving and Markowitsch 1998), in which 
incoming perceptual information is initially represented semantically, 
but that a second, episodic, representation is formed from the 
semantic one. Once both representations are set (during retrieval for 
example) they are basically equal and independent, though able to 
interact via reactivation into working memory (Baddeley 2001). In 
terms of damage induced retrograde amnesia the SPI model allows for
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a complete dissociation of episodic and semantic knowledge (either 
can be impaired to any degree regardless of the other), though in the 
anterograde direction it predicts semantic impairment must necessarily 
cause episodic impairment, though the same does not hold in reverse. 
This is in contrast to Squire's theory, which allows no.dissociation 
whatsoever. Tulving's theory is a purely cognitive one, developed 
primarily from observations of amnesic humans, and does not specify 
what circuits are involved at each level of processing.
In light of these theories, there are a number of different ways in 
which the large body of research pertaining to the nature of episodic 
and semantic memory, their differences, and how they interact.
The Hippocampus and Episodic Memory:
The first clear indications that the hippocampus and related 
medial temporal lobe structures played a role in memory are found in 
Scoville and Milner's (1957) classic studies on the patient H.M. He 
exhibited profound and selective amnesia for declarative memory 
following a medial temporal lobe resection undertaken to control 
intractable epilepsy. H.M.'s damage was quite widespread however, 
and thus specific contributions of the structures within the medial 
temporal lobe to memory could not be dissociated. In 1997, Vargha- 
Khadeem et al. described 3 case studies in which children with early
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life anoxic trauma localized bilaterally to the hippocampus (i.e. not 
including parahippocampal cortices) were still capable of acquiring a 
large amount of semantic knowledge (with school performance even 
approaching normal). Despite this sparing of learning general 
knowledge they had a complete inability to describe specific episodes 
in which they acquired their wealth of knowledge. One patient, K.C., 
for example could learn to play new games or memorize sentences 
without any recollection of the learning experience. They had profound 
anterograde amnesia for episodes, concurrent with normal (or at least 
non-pathological) semantic retention. A separate group of patients 
ranging in age from 6-14 at time of onset of hypoxic damage showed a 
similar pattern of severe episodic memory impairment coincident with 
comparatively mild semantic deficits (Kitchener et al. 1998; Holdstock 
et al. 2000). The young age of the children is an important part of the 
challenge this work presents for Squire's declarative model, as it 
precludes the possibility that a large repertoire of semantic knowledge 
could have already been consolidated in the neocortex before onset of 
the pathology. In line with Conjunctive and SPI theories, and patently 
pertinent to episodic memory, sparing for individual item memories 
was seen, but not for more complex associations involving relations 
between many items or the context in which they were located. This 
indicates that the dissociation between episodic and semantic memory
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is not simply a categorical one, but may have a true neuroanatomical 
underpinning. Their findings support a model localizing semantic 
functions to parahippocampal cortices but not to the hippocampus 
itself. It is in hippocampal circuitry that critical episodic functions are 
proposed to be instantiated (Tulving and Markowitscb 1998). Vargha- 
Khadem, Gadian and Mishkin (2001) conclude, based on this evidence 
and an additional review of 11 other amnesic patients that, "... 
regardless of age at onset of hippocampal pathology, there is a 
pronounced dissociation between episodic memory, which is severely 
impaired, and semantic memory, which is relatively preserved." (p. 
139).
These observations seem to be a significant blow to Declarative 
Theory, though in a commentary Squire and Zola (1998) argue that 
the results can also be interpreted in light of the possibility that 
enough hippocampal tissue remained to support traces of online event 
memory capacity which, though barely detectable, was still sufficient 
to facilitate formation of semantic traces. Configural association theory 
on the other hand is clearly supported by Vargha-Khadem's 
observations of a critical and dissociable role of the hippocampus 
proper in episodic versus semantic memory.
Tulving and others infer from these studies that the 
hippocampus plays a critical role in episodic, but not semantic
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knowledge. Semantic memories depend upon the adjacent medial 
temporal lobe cortices (Tulving and Markowitsch, 1998). More 
extensive medial temporal lobe damage then, such as that seen in 
H.M., would not show a dissociation between semantic and episodic 
processes, and for the most part this is in fact the case (Penfield and 
Milner 1958; Scoville and Milner, 1957). It has also been stated by a 
number of researchers that hippocampal damage is necessary and 
sufficient to cause anterograde amnesia for of episodic memory in 
humans (O'Keefe & Nadel 1978; Morris et al. 1982; Maguire et al. 
1996; Rosenbaum et al. 2000). Rats with hippocampal damage 
however can still acquire some configural associations if given enough 
exposure (Rudy and Sutherland 1995; Bussey et al 1998; Davidson et 
al. 1993), emphasizing the importance of the requirement for an 
episodic model to avoid extensive pre-training and ideally limit the 
learning episode to a single, short experience (Dere et al., 2006), as is 
the case in the model given here and in Chapter 2.
The Prefrontal Cortex and Episodic Memory:
Episodic memory requires binding of the many elements 
comprising an experience into a conjunctive contextual representation, 
a requirement all evidence indicates would depend on the 
hippocampus. Some form of temporal sequencing or time-stamping of
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these representations would also seem to be necessary. A contextual 
representation might be akin to a snapshot, fixed in time, whereas an 
episodic memory is more like a film clip, a sequence of events with a 
specific order of flow from beginning to end, and having a specific 
temporal position in relation to other such events which have been 
stored. Evidence stemming from functional neuroimaging (Knutson et 
al., 2004) and lesion studies (Canavan et al., 1989; Hanneson et al., 
2004 McAndrews & Milner 1990; Shimamura et al., 1990) suggests 
that this temporal sequencing capacity is critically dependent upon the 
medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) via its numerous connections with 
medial temporal lobe memory systems (Aggleton & Pearce 2001). 
Fuster et al. (2000) for instance has demonstrated an essential role of 
the mPFC in association of stimuli separated in terms of both time and 
modality. It has also been demonstrated to be necessary for trace fear 
conditioning (Runyan et al., 2004). With temporal aspects being one of 
the things uniquely added in episodic representations, the prediction 
follows that damage to mPFC could allow another kind of dissociation 
of episodic and semantic memory functions.
In a commentary paper reviewing the findings of a number of 
clinical and neuroanatomical studies of amnesic patients, including the 
Vargha-Khadeem studies, Zola and Squire (1998) suggest that 
prefrontal effects are dissociable, with episodic-type memories being
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far more susceptible, if not uniquely susceptible to damage, although 
these two types of memory are not dissociable on their view in medial 
temporal lobe amnesia. There is an emerging consensus then that the 
PFC plays a critical role of episodic memory in humans (Wheeler et al., 
1995; Nyberg et al., 2000; Burgess et al., 2002; Wheeler and Stuss, 
2003; Schacter, 1987; Squire 1987).
While it is fairly certain that the PFC plays an important role in 
episodic memory, the exact nature of its involvement in formation and 
recall is somewhat unclear (it is possible that it plays a role solely in 
the latter). Lesions restricted to the frontal cortex do not generally 
result in identifiable amnesia, defined as an inability to acquire and 
later explicitly reproduce knowledge (Milner 1964). Deficits that are 
encountered typically have been attributed to the loss of mnemonic 
strategies or organizational capacity (Smith and Milner 1984), rather 
than loss of a site of information storage. The dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex is also thought to provide essential circuitry underlying working 
memory (Goldman-Rakic 1987), and it may be that this type of short­
term memory is required for dealing with retrieved conjunctive 
representations of contexts and the additional information that must 
be bound to them as part of the memory reconstruction during 
episodic recall. It has also been proposed that the medial temporal 
lobe structures support the representation of the context and possibly
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associations of events to that context, whereas the prefrontal areas
4;
are responsible for association of temporal cues to the contextual 
representation (Nadel and Moscovitch 1997, 1998).
Tulving and colleagues claim that in humans the role is 
facilitation of an autonoetic consciousness that is essential for mental 
time travel during retrieval (Wheeler, Stuss & Tulving, 1997). He 
described for instance a frontal lobe patient lacking not only episodic 
memory, but also any capacity to imagine either past or future 
(Tulving 1985). This was taken as evidence that the PFC housed a 
faculty of special autonoetic conscious awareness necessary for 
representing one's self in mental space. Specifically, it is said to 
provide the ability to perceive one's own position along an 
autobiographical timeline, and mentally project in either direction away 
form the present "stream of consciousness". These issues have not yet 
been resolved in humans, and so should not be expected to be solved 
here, though the emergence of animal models of episodic memory 
may in future shed some light on these questions.
Further clarification of the frontal lobe's role in memory is 
provided by cases of source amnesia, in which factual information can 
be acquired without conscious recollection of where and when the 
actual learning experience occurred (Schacter, Harbluk and McLachlan, 
1984). Interestingly, it seems to be one of the only forms of memory
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impairment consistently demonstrated in lesions restricted to the 
frontal lobes. While subjects have no problem identifying items which 
had previously been presented to them as familiar, they have far more 
difficulty than controls in recollecting where the item was encountered. 
They make numerous false positive responses in which the learning 
location is misattributed. Consistent with the idea that episodic 
information is particularly susceptible to impairment, problems in 
source attribution (Glisky, Polster, & Routhieaux, 1995) or recency 
judgements (Milner Corsi and Leonard, 1991 as cited in Moscovitch 
1992) typically precede problems with recognition in normally aging 
individuals.
In a 1995 paper, Wheeler, Stuss, and Tulving conduct a fairly 
extensive empirical review of memory deficits in frontal lobe patients 
studied up until that point. The main findings included a small but 
detectable recognition impairment, possibly explained by minute septal 
damage, or a loss of organizational strategies. More drastic and 
important was a consistent trend of major impairment in recall above 
and beyond recognition. Similarly, in the animal literature, Hanneson 
Howland and Phillips (2004) have demonstrated that medial prefrontal 
lesions in the rat impair the ability to make temporal order judgments 
for objects they have explored, in the presence of intact object 
recognition ability.
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Neuroimaging Studies:
Functional neuroimaging studies provide an additional powerful 
means of examining the relationship between semantic and episodic 
processes. By monitoring brain activity during very similar tasks, one 
semantic in nature and the other episodic, one can identify all the 
shared areas of activity and subtract them, identifying the specific 
regions uniquely involved in one and not the other.
The most common means of testing for episodic/semantic 
distinctions in humans involves distinguishing between remembering 
and knowing using word lists. Participants are given a list of words to 
remember, and then at a subsequent time are presented with a new 
list containing some of the words from the original list mixed in with 
new ones. The participant is then asked to decide whether each word 
had appeared on the list or not, and for words they claim were on the 
original list, they are asked whether they remember the actual event 
of seeing the word on the list, or if they simply 'know' it was there 
(Tulving 1985; Gardiner and Java 1991). Thus confidence is used as 
the prime indicator of whether the memory was episodic or not. It is 
seen that the remembered items are subject to the same sorts of 
variables that are widely accepted as affecting episodic memory 
(Wheeler 2000). When these types of tests are conducted, it is
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consistently found by a variety of investigators that the frontal cortex 
is active during episodic, but not semantic representation.
In general, evidence obtained from such functional imaging 
investigations shows that episodic memory processes consistently 
involve activity in the PFC, whereas semantic processing does not 
(Nyberg et al., 1996; Schacter 1987; Tulving 1986; Kapur et al., 
2004). This confirms the trend observed in the lesion studies reviewed 
above. Specifically, episodic retrieval is selectively associated with 
increased blood flow in the right hemisphere PFC. A hemispheric 
asymmetry in acquisition has also been observed, with an increase in 
left medial frontal gyrus blood flow during episodic encoding, but not 
semantic (Fletcher et al., 1995; Nyberg, Cabeza & Tulving 1996).
Right frontal blood flow was equivalent (Kapur et al., 1995; Nyberg et 
al., 1995). Tulving states that the frontal lobes are involved in creating 
an 'episodic retrieval mode', an autonoetic state where the brain is 
primed to use retrieval cues specifically for experiences involving 
autonoetic consciousness (Tulving 1983).
The pattern of lateralization noted is also seen in other item 
recognition tasks, and is referred to as HERA (hemispheric 
encoding/retrieval asymmetry (Tulving et al., 1994; Habib et al., 
2003). Lateralization is not as prominent in non-primate mammals 
such as the rat however, and so was not tested for in this study.
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Just as the circuitry and function of the rat hippocampus is 
known to be very similar to that of humans, the basis for innumerable 
models in the memory domain (Whishaw & Kolb 2004), PFC circuitry 
and function between rats and humans also appear to be conserved 
(Dailey et al., 2004 for review). As reviewed above, tbe PFC seems to 
play a specific role in episodic memory in humans, while it makes 
minimal or no contributions to non-temporal or recollective, semantic 
aspects of declarative memory processes (McDonald et al., 2006; 
Wheeler et al., 1995; Squire 1987).
Curiously, given the large number of recent animal models 
purported to be true demonstrations of episodic memory, there is 
virtually no literature on the effects of frontal cortex lesions on 
episodic memory performance outside of humans or primates. From 
what has been reviewed concerning their specificity of effect on 
episodic type processes over semantic ones in humans, performing 
anterograde tests of prefrontal dependency would seem a valuable and 
informative test of whether or not one's episodic model taps into the 
same brain regions involved in human episodic recall. An impairment 
in performance would provide some evidence that a task is not solved 
via some sort of semantic rule learning or simple associative strategy. 
In an effort to test our model for not just behavioural, but also
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neuroanatomical, parallels with human episodic memory, we here 
administer such a test in Experiment 6.
We also tested a conditioning procedure that closely resembled 
our basic episodic memory task, but we modified it so that it did not 
require an integrated what-where-when (episodic) representation. If 
the modified task does not require prefrontal involvement, but our 
basic episodic task does, this would provide good evidence that our 
model taps into very similar processes as in humans. We are then 
viewing the episodic memory system as an extension of the semantic 
system, both neuroanatomically and likely evolutionarily. An episodic 
representation will require the same types of configural/conjunctive 
associations required for forming semantic representation (mediated 
by the hippocampus and neocortex), plus additional information, or at 
least direction, from the PFC. Thus, it should be possible to observe a 
deficit in episodic memory in the presence of PFC damage, while 
semantic abilities remain intact. According to conjunctive theory, new 
associations amongst non-linear configural representations such as are 
required to associate conditioning to memory of a context during 
immediate shock will also necessarily require the hippocampus (Rudy 
et al., 2002), though Declarative Theory also predicts an essential 
hippocampal contribution.
METHODS
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Subjects:
Subjects were male Long Evans hooded rats (Charles River 
Laboratories) approximately 75 days of age (250-350 grams). Animals 
were housed in pairs in standard plastic housing tubs (45 cm x 25 cm 
x 25 cm) on a 12 h light/dark cycle (lights on at 7 a.m.). Food and 
water was provided ad libitum, and a single piece of PVC tubing was 
provided in the cage for enrichment.
Apparatus:
Plexiglas modular test chambers (ENV-008 MedAssociates, Inc., 
Georgia, VT) with steel bar floors were used as the context boxes for 
all experiments. In experiments 5 and 6, boxes were modified so as to 
provide three distinct contexts. Context A had black walls and was 
scented with Quatzyl-D-Plus brand disinfectant. Box B was white 
walled and sprayed for odour with Clinicide disinfectant. Box C was 
designed to be equally similar to boxes A and B - the walls were half 
white, half black, and the chamber was left unscented (a small amount 
100% ethanol was used for cleaning in between trials, and allowed to 
completely evaporate). Chamber ceilings were left clear to allow for 
top-down video recording of behaviour. Scents and wall shading were 
counterbalanced. Experiment one used only a single context, either A
i;
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or B depending on the subject. All boxes were in the same spatial 
location.
Surgery:
Nearly complete lesions of the hippocampus were created by 
stereotaxic infusion of n-methyl-D-aspartate (NMDA), conducted under 
isoflurane induced general anaesthesia (2% isoflurane delivered in 2 
L/min oxygen). Rat's heads were shaved and the skin was cleaned by 
three alternating applications of hibitane (4% chlorohexidine 
gluconate) and 70 % alcohol. 0.1 mg/kg temgesic was given s.c. 
immediately prior to stereotaxic mounting (David Kopf Instruments) as 
an analgesic, and .2 mg/kg diazepam was given immediately prior to 
NMDA infusion for the purpose of controlling seizure activity. Drugs 
were re-administered following recovery from anesthesia for the same 
purposes. An incision was made through the skin and periosteum, 
which were retracted from the skull and held using hemostats. Small 
holes were drilled above the desired injection sites into which 30 
gauge cannulae connected via PE50 plastic tubing to a 10 ul Hamilton 
syringe (Hamilton, Reno, NV) mounted on an infusion pump (Harvard 
Apparatus PHD2000, Holliston, MA) were lowered to the desired depth. 
Infusion rate was set to 0.15 ul/min, and 0.4 ul total of 7.5mg/ml 
NMDA in phosphate buffered saline was infused over 2 minutes and 40
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seconds to each of 7 sites per hemisphere. Injection cannulae were left
ft ;
in place for 2 minutes 20 seconds to allow for diffusion from the tip 
before retraction. Injection co-ordinates from bregma with skull flat 
were as follows: (AP -3.1, ML +-1.5, DV -3.6), (AP -4.1, LV +-3, DV - 
4), (AP -5, ML +-3, DV -4), (AP -5, ML +-5.2, DV -7.3), (AP -5.8, ML 
+-4.4, DV -4.4), (AP -5.8, ML +-5.1, DV -7.5,), (AP -5.8, ML +-5.1,
DV -6.2).
Medial prefrontal cortical lesions were performed using a very 
similar surgery procedure and drug regimens as used for the 
hippocampal lesion. lOmg/ml NMDA was infused at O.lul/min for 4 
minutes followed by 2 minutes diffusion time for each of 5 sites per 
hemisphere. Injection co-ordinates from bregma with skull flat were: 
(AP +4, ML +-0.7, DV -4.8), (AP +4, LV +-0.7, DV -2.8), (AP +2.7, ML 
+-0.7, DV -5.6), (AP +2.7, ML +-0.7, DV -3.5), (AP +1.7, ML +-0.7,
DV -3.2).
Sham surgery was performed on all control rats by performing 
the hippocampal lesion procedure with the omission of skull puncture 
or NMDA infusion. For Experiment 4, 6 hippocampal lesions, 8 mPFC 
lesions and 8 sham surgeries were conducted. Experiment 5 used 10 
hippocampal lesioned rats, and 10 shams; Experiment 6 subjects were 
12 mPFC lesioned rats and 12 shams.
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Procedure:
Rats were allowed 10 days of post surgery recovery time before 
training began. Experiment 4, as illustrated in Figure 4, was effectively 
just a replication of Fanselow's immediate shock protocol (figure 1.4), 
except with multiple pre-exposure sessions. During phase 1, animals 
were placed in a single context (A or B) for successive three days , 
with exposure times of 9, 7 and 5 minutes for days 1, 2 and 3 
respectively. In phase 3 (day 4) animals received a single immediate 
foot shock in the same context. They received a 1.0 mA footshock of 2 
seconds duration. There was a 2 second shock free interval before and 
a 3 second shock free interval after the shock. The shock was 
delivered through the floor bars. Phase 3 was a 3 minute exposure 
period in the shock context during which freezing behaviour was 
recorded and the percent of time spent freezing for each minute was 
calculated by an automated computerized video system. All phases 
were conducted approximately mid-day (between 3 and 5 p.m.).
Experiments 5 and 6 involved the same procedure as described 
in Chapter 2 and illustrated in Figure l.l.^Phase 1 involved two pre­
exposure phases per day, for each rat, over a three day period. One 
pre-exposure session was in box A and conducted between 9 and 11 
a.m., the other was in box B and given between 9 and 11 p.m. 
Exposure times were the same per context per day as in experiment 4
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(for a total duration of 21 minutes per context in phase 1). Phase 2 
was an immediate shock as described exactly for Experiment 4, but it 
was given in the chimeric context (Box C). For half of the rats the 
shock was provided in the morning exposure time, for the other half it 
was provided in the night. Phase 3 was a 3 minute test period scored 
for freezing using the same automated procedures as in all other 
experiments. Half of the rats were tested in the context that had been 
previously paired in Phase 1 with the time the animal ended up being 
shocked at in Phase 2 (i.e. the congruent context), the other half were 
tested in the incongruent context. Exposure contexts and times were 
counterbalanced across and within groups.
Histology:
After testing animals were euthanized by an overdose of sodium 
pentobarbital (Euthansol, Schering, Kenilworth, NJ) and then perfused 
intra-cardially first with 200 ml phosphate buffered saline (PBS) and 
then an equal volume of 4% paraformaldehyde in PBS. Brains were 
extracted and left in a 30% sucrose, 4% paraformaldehyde in PBS 
solution for at least 48 hours prior to being sliced coronally at 40 urn 
on a cryostat (MICROM HM560, Waldorf, Germany) and stained for 
cresyl violet. Section samples were taken to the full extent of the 
lesions.
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EXPERIMENT 4: The hippocampus, but not frontal lobes, is 
required for context conditioning using immediate shock
Hippocampal damage should disrupt acquisition of fear of a pre­
exposed context using the immediate shock procedure. However, 
unlike its predicted effect on time plus context fear memory, mPFC 
should not disrupt acquisition in this experimental task. This is based 
upon the idea that mPFC is hypothesized not to be important for 
context representation or fear association, but are necessary for 
permitting the use of temporal cues to distinguish between contexts. 
Our work here is essentially a successful attempt to systematically 
replicate previously published studies showing that the hippocampus is 
responsible for contextual fear conditioning, and that the medial 
prefrontal cortex is not (Gewirtz, Falls & Davis, 1997; Rudy and 
O'Reilly 2001). Here we use a set of conditioning parameters that are 
different from published work, but that are directly relevant to 
conditions in our previous experiments.
Results and Discussion
Results are presented graphically in Figure 3.4. A main effect of 
lesion on freezing behaviour was evident based on repeated measure 
ANOVA (F (2, 15) = 4.71, p < .05). The amount of freezing did not
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significantly change across the three minutes of testing. Post hoc 
analysis indicated significantly less freezing was exhibited by the 
hippocampal lesion group compared to the Sham control group (p < 
.05) or medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) lesioned animals (p = .037) 
.No difference, however, was observed between the Sham control and 
Prefrontal lesion groups.
The hippocampus is thus confirmed to be necessary for the type 
of fast conjunctive/configural association involved in the immediate 
shock effect (Rudy and O'Reilly 2001), but the mPFC is not necessary 
for mediating learned fear of a context in a task with very similar 
parameters to our episodic memory task, with the exception that there 
is not a time-place conjunction.
EXPERIMENT 5: Hippocampal requirement of episodic model
In this experiment we test Sham control and hippocampal 
damaged rats in the episodic memory task described in Experiment 1 
(Figure 1.1). Without an intact hippocampal formation it is predicted 
that rats will be unable to show discriminative learned fear involving 
the two contexts. Based upon the results of Experiment 4, it is 
hypothesized that rats with hippocampal damage should not even have 
a contextual representation that could be associated with fear in the 
immediate shock procedure, and so these rats should show equivalent 
conditioned fear responses to the congruent and incongruent test
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contexts, albeit at a reduced magnitude. With episodic memory 
requiring a multimodal conjunction of allocentric spatial context and 
integration of multiple elemental cues, the hippocampus should 
obviously play an essential role. As the hippocampus has been 
conclusively shown to have an important role in regular contextual fear 
conditioning (Maren et al., 1998; Phillips & LeDoux, 1992), as well as 
the immediate shock or "Fanselow effect" variant (Rudy and O'Reilly 
2001), it is predicted to be required for expression of fear in our model 
of episodic memory. The procedure used is the same as described in 
Figure 1.1 and discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Rats are given an 
exposure session to one context in the evening and a second in the 
morning for a period of three days. On the fourth day they are given 
immediate shock in either the morning or evening
Results and Discussion:
All rats displayed robust freezing behaviour which was seen to 
decline over the three minute test period (Figure 3.5). Repeated 
measures ANOVAs were conducted on the two different lesion groups 
tested either in the congruent or incongruent contexts. There was a 
significant difference in freezing between groups (F (3, 16) = 10.3, p 
= .001). The Post hoc tests showed that the Sham control group
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tested in the congruent box showed significantly more freezing than 
any of the other three groups (all p's < .007).
As has already been demonstrated in Experiment 1 intact rats 
show strong learned fear of a context previously paired with the time 
of day of a foot shock. As predicted, rats with hippocampal damage do 
not show this effect. Thus, the hippocampus is essential to this form of 
episodic memory. This should not be surprising given the results of 
Experiment 4 showing that the hippocampus is essential to simple 
contextual fear conditioning using the "Fanselow effect".
EXPERIMENT 6: Frontal lobe requirement for episodic model
We hypothesize that damage to the mPFC will impair performance in 
the episodic memory task to the same extent as that observed in rats 
with hippocampal damage. Episodic memory is understood as a unified 
representation of both a conjunctive contextual component along with 
some form of as yet unspecified temporal information provided by the 
mPFC. In the absence of this temporal information, the time 
appropriate context will not be retrieved to be associated with foot 
shock.
Results and Discussion
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As seen in Figure 3.6, mPFC lesions produced a similar pattern of 
effect on freezing behaviour as that observed with the hippocampal 
lesions conducted in Experiment 5. All rats displayed robust freezing 
behaviour which was seen to decline over the three minute test period 
(Figure 3.6). Repeated measures ANOVAs were conducted on the two 
different lesion groups tested either in the congruent or incongruent 
contexts. There was a significant difference in freezing between groups 
(F (3, 16) = 7.8, p = .002). The post hoc tests showed that the Sham 
control group tested in the congruent box showed significantly more 
freezing than any of the other three groups (all p's < .05).
From what we observed in Experiment 4, we know that this 
pattern of impairment is not due to the same reasons as seen with 
hippocampal lesions in Experiment 5. Frontal cortex damaged animals 
are still capable of quickly acquiring a conjunctive context 
representation and associating it with shock, but here it is shown they 
cannot use a temporal cue to differentially attribute fear between pre­
exposed contexts at time of testing. The medial prefrontal cortex then 
must mediate specific processes involved in our episodic model, but 
not very similar processes not requiring a what-where-when 
conjunction.
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General Discussion:
In the previous experiments we have demonstrated a form of 
context + time memory in rats that we interpret as a close relative of 
human episodic memory. We demonstated that both hippocampal 
damage and mPFC damage disrupt performance in our rat episodic 
memory task. Furthermore we demonstrated that hippocampal 
damage but not mPFC damage disrupts the rat's ability to form a 
contextual fear memory in the immediate shock procedure even when 
the contextual memory conditioning is independent of time. This 
supports the idea that performance of episodic memory in rats, as 
described in Chapter 2, is dissociable from semantic or episode- 
independent memory by way of exclusive involvement of the mPFC 
regions in the former, as compared to dependence of both memory 
types on an intact hippocampus. Impairment of episodic memory in 
the presence of intact semantic capabilities replicates the same pattern 
of results observed in brain damaged humans. This is the first 
demonstration of such a parallel in a rodent model of episodic 
memory.
We propose that episodic memory is an extension of the medial 
temporal lobe semantic system, dependent upon the same stimulus 
conjunctions used to represent declarative memory of the non-episodic 
variety (Sutherland and Rudy 1995; Rudy and O'Reilly 2001), but with
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the additional requirement of PFC circuitry necessary for associating
t.
the temporal components which distinguish the uniqueness of 
individual experiences. The addition of a distinct episodic memory 
system built upon a semantic framework is amenable to the Serial, 
Parallel, Independent theory of declarative memory progression 
proposed by Tulving (1993), although the present work is in obvious 
opposition to Tulving's notion that episodic memory is a uniquely 
human trait involving dependence upon phenomenological 
characteristics accompanying recall ((Tulving, 1989, 2002). Our 
findings are also in accord with the notions of Nadel and Moscovitch 
(1997; Nadel et al., 2000) that episodic memory involves co­
ordination of a contextual representation provided by the medial 
temporal lobe, and a temporal trace localized to the prefrontal cortex. 
We do not find support for the longstanding conjecture that declarative 
memory represents a single medial temporal lobe system dealing 
indiscriminately with any form of semantic or episodic knowledge 
heralded by Squire and colleagues (Cohen and Squire, 1980; Squire, 
1992; Squire & Zola Morgan, 1998). (Tulving, 1989, 2002). It seems 
somewhat contradictory that Squire maintains his position of a single 
declarative memory system, while publishing manuscripts attesting to 
the role of the frontal cortex in episodic but not semantic memory 
(Squire 1987). Though the claim can be made that the frontal lobes
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are simply assisting in performance of recall type processes but not 
recognition, with formation and processing solely mediated by a single 
medial temporal lobe network, the very fact that the frontal lobes can 
interact with one but not the other type of memory would seem to 
imply these types of memory are in fact distinct and dissociable.
Future work with this model should allow for a more in-depth 
investigation of specific brain regions involved in mammalian episodic 
memory as well as how it changes with age and pathologies. Precision 
lesions unethical to administer to humans may also allow investigators 
to test the assertion of Declarative Theory (Squire and Cohen 1980) 
that semantic and episodic memory are not differentially represented 
in the medial temporal lobe, by taking advantage of histological 
techniques that could remove any doubt as to lesion locale or extent.
An additional experiment of interest would be to conduct place 
cell studies in which hippocampal cell assemblies representing each 
pre-exposure context are noted and conditions of their individual 
retrieval examined. It would be very convincing, for example, if a cell 
assembly associated with a context was reactivated even without re- 
exposure to the context, upon provision of retrieval cues such as 
removal from the home cage at the time of day associated with pre­
exposure. Such a demonstration may convince even the most 
steadfast of skeptics that episodic memory is a shared characteristic of
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rats and humans, perhaps even accompanied by a richly imagined re­
experiencing of the event context accompanying recall. Finally, 
sensitivity of this task to frontal lobe impairment provides a novel 
means of assessing integrity of this structure in rats, which may be 
useful in combination with other models of prefrontal dysfunction.
In summary, we have shown here that the model for episodic 
memory as described in the previous chapter exhibits very similar 
general neuroanatomical underpinnings to those serving episodic 
memory in humans. Not only does our task meet relevant behavioural 
criteria for the various definitions previously set forth by a number of 
different researchers (reviewed in the previous chapter), but it also 
relies on some of the same neural circuitry as human episodic 
memory. To our knowledge this is the first time specific brain regions 
underlying episodic memory in a rodent model have been investigated. 
Based on this, and in accord with observations in the human domain, 
we conclude that both the hippocampus and medial prefrontal cortex 
are necessary for episodic memory function in the rat. Excepting the 
issue of autonoesis in animals (Tulving 2002), all characteristics of 
human episodic memory have been shown to be present in our rat 
model, and we feel that appropriate protocols now exist for doing 
animal research in the area that will be applicable to human disorders 
of episodic malfunction.
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In a recent and extensive text summarizing nearly all of the 
research to date concerning the hippocampus (aptly entitled "The 
Hippocampus Book"), a section reviewing theories of function 
concludes with the statement, "... we still do not understand the 
precise role of the hippocampus in episodic and semantic memory or, 
within the domain of episodic memory, in familiarity and recollection... 
[This] points to the need to develop new animal models of these forms 
or memory and of retrieval to help resolve the issues." (Andersen et 
al., 2007 p. 617).
It is our hope and belief that the model described here will 
contribute substantially to that project.
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CHAPTER 4 - CONCLUSION
In the previous two chapters it has been shown that: 1) the rat 
can demonstrate the behavioural characteristics associated with 
episodic memory in humans, and 2) the execution of these behaviours 
depends critically on at least some of the same cortical regions already 
known to sub-serve them in humans. Though that would seem 
sufficient to now state unequivocally that rats have episodic memory, 
one problem, which may prove to be insurmountable, still remains. 
That is the issue of autonoetic consciousness.
When Tulving first presented the concept of episodic memory in 
1972, he defined it based on the type of information it represented. He 
asserted that it was a form of declarative memory that was distinct 
from purely semantic knowledge in that it represented not just rules, 
or verbally expressible information, but also a rich spatio-temporal 
structure. He further asserted, quite correctly, that these differences 
were no small matter, and in fact were so distinct that they would 
comprise two separate, though overlapping systems, with episodic 
memory requiring all that underlies semantic memory plus additional 
circuits to deal with these spatiotemporal associations. However, in 
1983 Tulving revised the definition of episodic memory so that it must 
also necessarily include certain phenomenological qualia. If one
66
retrieves an episodic memory, according to Tulving, he has the 
experience of reliving the event in the mental world, as the person it 
actually happened to, at the time it actually happened (though 
obviously as a mental representation of one's self rather than a 
physical being). He called this "Mental Time Travel". If we introspect 
on this, it has some intuitive appeal. If one thinks about the non- 
episodic question, "What is your favorite breakfast cereal," it is likely 
that a word, and just a word, is recalled, say 'Cheerios'. If, on the 
other hand one is asked "What did you have for breakfast this 
morning?" the recollective experience may change, such that instead 
of a list it is as if you have a mental image of actually eating the 
breakfast, within the spatial context of one's home, and with a sense 
of knowing that it is that morning and no other, while still of course 
remaining aware that one is really now at work, answering a question.
From this example we start to see why Tulving argues for three 
additional features of episodic memory to be explicitly shown, all 
implied by the concept 'autonoetic awareness': A sense of temporal 
awareness that centers on the individual,  ^referred to as subjective 
time; the awareness of self as an acting agent; and autonoetic 
awareness, the ability to represent one's self so as to be able to create 
a second, mental self which can operate in mental space (Tulving, 
1983; Tulving and Markowitsch, 1998). Unfortunately (though
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arguably not so importantly for our purposes), it is technically 
impossible to demonstrate these qualities in non-linguistic species. It 
is in fact not known whether these limitations are only technical. One 
simply cannot arrange to have a nonhuman animal tell you about its 
breakfast experience, nor prove that it has autonoetic awareness. 
Tulving claims there are not even analogues of these abilities outside 
humans, based on a lack of empirical evidence. One could however 
make the equally incontrovertible claim that humans without 
communication do not have autonoetic awareness either, though 
common sense seems to preclude this.
Tulving, however, does concede that, "In many ways, the 
relation between autonoetic consciousness and episodic memory can 
be thought of as much a matter of definition as a matter of empirical 
facts; we have defined episodic memory in terms of its dependence on 
autonoetic awareness." (Wheeler, Stuss and Tulving, 1997 p. 343). His 
solution to the seeming lack of room for empirical testing or support of 
this assertion is to outline the correlation in development of a sense of 
awareness and the advent of episodic memory functions. Children do 
not usually start expressing episodic memory until after certain 
benchmarks of development that can be interpreted as conscious self 
awareness or a theory of mind (Piaget, 1997). Most of this however is 
simply correlational, and correlating one trait that is found in animals
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and humans alike (episodic memory, as defined by function) to 
another that arguably is not (conscious awareness) does not prove one 
is required for the other.
Tulving does hypothesize that the circuits underlying autonoetic 
consciousness essentially involve the frontal lobes of humans 
(Wheeler, Stuss and Tulving, 1997), and performance of our task has 
been shown to be critically dependent upon a similar area in the rat 
(Chapter 3).
There is no consensus about non-linguistic behavioural 
indicators of conscious experience (Griffiths et al., 1999). However, 
one that would reasonably seem to indicate consciousness is the 
apparent presence of dreams in animals. Many people have 
anecdotes of their animals looking like they are acting out dreams 
in their sleep, but Louie and Wilson's (2001) group at MIT have 
given a much more convincing demonstration. They recorded cell 
activity in the hippocampus as animals ran a circular maze for food 
reward. Later, as animals were in REM sleep it was seen that the 
exact same patterns of cell activity recorded during the task was 
also seen in the dreaming animals, with firing rate and changes in 
firing patterns occurring at the same speed as was observed in the 
awake rats while running. Although the realm of dreaming is still 
considered by most to be outside the realm of empirical science, if
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this study's conclusions can be accepted that may actually solve the 
(unnecessary) problem of proving animals have a self concept, and 
even a meta-representation of themselves. If not, then who is 
dreaming? Frith et al. (1999) furthermore show that many of the 
other accepted neural correlates of conscious experiences are also 
present in animals. Thus it may even be the case that animals do 
exhibit some form of autonoetic consciousness, though lack of 
sufficient proof of this to date should be no more valid a reason for 
limiting animal models of episodic memory than it should models of 
pain or age related dementia.
Virtually any cognitive process can be said to be accompanied in 
humans by some sort of special awareness, but this is not essential, 
and may often not even be important to its function. It could be said 
when a person feels pain there is an essential qualia of agony that is 
additional to the outward manifestations such as grimacing, yelping, 
and subsequent avoidance of associated contexts, and that while 
animals may exhibit all the same observable features of pain, what 
they are experiencing is only 'pain-like' due to a lack of accompanying 
intangible phenomenological qualities. Even if this is true, it makes no 
difference in terms of the benefits that can be derived from using 
animal models of pain for research. If we did not, all of humanity 
would be many years behind in medical science and quality and
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duration of life.
Most certainly vision is not experienced the same way in humans 
and animals, nor pain or olfaction, yet we still refer to them by the 
same name in both species as they serve the same function using very 
similar, but not identical structures. Likewise we do not include 'being 
aware that one is viewing' as mandatory in animal models of vision. It 
may be that the animal just operates as a stimulus-response 
automaton to different patterns of photons on the retina, or it may be 
that it experiences a rich visual motion picture such as we do, but this 
difference has not been in any way an impediment to vision research. 
If the same functions can be shown to be served by very similar brain 
networks, that should be sufficient to advance claims about the utility 
of the nonhuman model for human processes. Autonoesis may not be 
an essential component of the function of episodic memories in 
humans. To say that we cannot use nonhuman animals to model 
episodic memory, given the considerations raised by the experiments 
conducted and the literature reviewed in this manuscript, is 
counterproductive to say the least.
It is important then to recognize that we are not claiming to 
have demonstrated autonoetic awareness in the rat, as would be 
required to classify the processes we are observing as "episodic 
memory" according to Tulving's definition. What we do show is that
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rats are capable of using the 'when' component of an experience to 
determine the 'what' and 'where', suggesting these components are 
linked together in an integrated representation. It is not difficult to see 
that non-human animals could benefit from a system that allowed 
them to discriminate life events, and remember specific experiences 
marked by time and place rather than just simple cause and effect 
generalizations about the world. It is also rare that a complex trait 
would suddenly occur in only a single species with little relevant 
evolutionary precursors or foundation.
While it may currently be impossible to show animals can meet 
the autonoetic criterion of Tulving's episodic memory, it does appear 
that at least two species other than humans can form memories that 
consist of an integrated representation of time, place and event nature 
(Chapter 2). Furthermore, these representations rely upon at least 
some of the same neural circuitry in nonhuman animals as they do in 
humans (Chapter 3). Like all animal models this one is only an 
approximation of the human processes, but this makes it no less 
useful in permitting experimental manipulations relevant to humans 
and possibly in elucidating the evolutionary history of the trait.
As to the importance of this work, episodic memory models are 
of particular clinical relevance because it is these memories which are 
most susceptible to nearly all forms of insult. When we think of
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memory loss resulting from neurodegenerative diseases such as 
Alzheimer's (Small et al., 2005), or even acute trauma such as a 
closed head injury, patients do not typically lose their lexicon or forget 
how to walk - they are most likely to lose recent portions of their 
autobiographical record in both the retrograde and anterograde 
direction. They may forget where they were, having met another 
individual, or what they had to eat. They will very rarely, however, 
forget how to eat, the name of their country, or the capital of France, 
etc.. (Evans et al., 1993; Duffy and O'Carroll, 1994; Greene et al., 
1996). A similar pattern of susceptibility is also seen in normal aging 
(Herlitz and Forsell 1996; Nilsson et al., 1997; Tulving & Markowitsch 
1998). Tulving and Markowitsch (1998) for example describe episodic 
memory as a system which develops late and decays early.
Memory deficits in autism have also been described to include a 
lack of ability to form episodic memories, while still maintaining an 
intact semantic repertoire. Autism is a developmental disorder which 
results in dysfunctional limbic-prefrontal connections, while largely 
preserving the integrity of the rest of the limbic system (Ben Shalom, 
D., 2003). Korsakoff's syndrome, attributed to damage of a system 
including the mammilary bodies and anterior thalamic nuclei that are 
important in connecting hippocampus with prefrontal cortex (Aggleton
73
& Pierce, 2002), is an additional condition associated with specific 
episodic deficits.
It is possible that the episodic memory model presented in this 
manuscript could be combined with models of neurodegenerative 
disease or acute trauma in rats. It would be particularly convincing if it 
was shown that this behaviour, and other demonstrations of episodic 
memory in the rat or jay, are more susceptible to removal (failure? 
breakdown?) in models of dementia and cognitive decline both 
pathological and due simply to normal aging, as is clearly the case in 
humans. Combined with all the previous studies reviewed above, it can 
now more confidently be stated that episodic memory does exist 
outside of humans, and we should take advantage of this fact by using 
animal models for the benefit of human health and to further our 
understanding of human memory. The debate about autonoetic 
awareness may have benefit in a different realm of scholarly activity.
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FIGURES
Figure 1.1. In Phase 1 rats are exposed to one context in the morning, and a second in 
the evening for 3 days. During Phase 2 rats are shocked immediately either in the 
morning or evening in a context which equally resembles the two contexts from Phase 1. 
Phase 3 is an exposure at mid-day video recorded to monitor freezing behaviour of a 
subject in either the context experienced during the mornings o f Phase 1 or the evenings.
PHASE 1 l  PHASE 2 PHASE 3
Pre-Exposure - .^Immediate Shock Testing
Figure 1.2. In phase 1 rats are exposed consecutively to two different contexts once a day 
for three days. During Phase 2 they are immediately shocked in a context comprised of 
equal elements of both Phase 1 contexts. Phase 3 is a motion recorded exposure session 
in either of the phase 1 contexts. All phases are conducted at approximately mid-day.
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PHASE 1 PHASE 2  PHASE 3
Pre-Exposure Immediate Shock Testing
Figure 1.3. In Phase 1 rats are exposed over three days to one context in the morning and 
a second in the evening. For Phase 2 they are immediately shocked either in the morning 
or evening in a context equally similar to the two phase 1 contexts. At Phase 3 rats are 
tested for freezing in the same context they were shocked in during Phase 2.
PHASE 1 PHASE 2  PHASE 3
Pre-Exposure Immediate Shock Testing
Figure 1.4. Rats are exposed to a single context once a day for 3 days (Phase 1), then 
given an immediate shock in that context during Phase 2 and subsequently tested for 
freezing behaviour in Phase 3. All exposures occur at the same time of day.
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Figure 2.1. Tissue sections stained using Cresyl violet demonstrate typical lesion extent 
observed in animals given NMDA infusions to the medial prefrontal cortex (right) as 
compared to shams (left), arranged anterior to posterior in descending order.
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Figure 2. 2. Cresyl violet stained section demonstrating typical lesion extent observed in 
animals subjected to NMDA induced hippocampalectomy (right) as compared to shams 
(left), and arranged from anterior to posterior down the page.
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Figure 3. 1. Rats subjected to the episodic memory task illustrated in figure 1.1. show far 
more fear memory of the pre-exposure context congruent to the time of day at which they 
were shocked than the incongruent one, as indicated by percentage o f time in which they 
exhibit freezing behaviour. Bars represent standard error of the mean.
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35
Figure 3. 2. Rats given the same duration and order of exposures as in the episodic 
memory task, but without a temporal distinction between contexts (as seen in figure 1.2.) 
do not differentially attribute fear to one pre-exposure context over the other, though they 
do learn a generalized fear association.
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Figure 3.3. Rats exhibit more fear memory to the context in which pre-exposure time 
was congruent to shock time than to the chimeric context in which the immediate shock 
was actually delivered (procedure illustrated in figure 1.3).
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Figure 3. 4. When performing a version of immediate shock which does not involve a 
temporal association to context (as per figure 1.4), rats with hippocampal lesions show 
impaired fear memory while those with damage to the medial prefrontal cortex do not.
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Figure 3. 5. Rats with hippocampal lesions do not discriminate between congruent and 
incongruent shock contexts in the model of episodic memory illustrated in figure 1.1.
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Figure 3. 6. Rats without an intact medial prefrontal cortex are impaired in the test of 
episodic memory described in figure 1.1.
91
